How to make the cooperation stable? by Petrosyan, Leon
Slide 1 of 22
How to make the cooperation stable?
Leon A. Petrosyan
Faculty of Applied Mathematics,
St.Petersburg State University,
St.Petersburg, Russia
mailto:spbuoasis7@peterlink.ru
Warwick, April’2010
Slide 2 of 22
Introduction
Cooperation is a basic form of human behavior. And for many practical reasons it is important that
cooperation stable on a time interval under consideration. There are three important aspects which
must be taken into account when the problem of stability of long-range cooperative agreements is
investigated.
1. Time-consistency (dynamic stability) of the cooperative agreements. Time-consistency
involves the property that, as the cooperation develops cooperating partners are guided by
the same optimality principle at each instant of time and hence do not possess incentives to
deviate from the previously adopted cooperative behavior.
2. Strategic stability. The agreement is to be developed in such a manner that at least
individual deviations from the cooperation by each partner will not give any advantage to
the deviator. This means that the outcome of cooperative agreement must be attained in
some Nash equilibrium, which will guarantee the strategic support of the cooperation.
3. Irrational behavior proofness. This aspect must be also taken in account since not always
one can be sure that the partners will behave rational on a long time interval for which the
cooperative agreement is valid. The partners involved in the cooperation must be sure that
even in the worst case scenario they will not loose compared with non cooperative behavior.
The mathematical tool based on payoff distribution procedure (PDP) or imputation distribution
procedure (IDP) is developed to deal with the above mentioned aspects of cooperation.
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1 Continuous time case
Consider n-person differential game Γ(x0, T − t0) with prescribed duration and independent
motions on the time interval [t0, T ]. Motion equations have the form:
x˙i = fi(xi, ui), ui ∈ Ui ⊂ R`, xi ∈ Rn,
xi(t0) = x
0
i , i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
It is assumed that the system of differential equations (1) satisfies all conditions necessary for the
existence, prolongability and uniqueness of the solution for any n-tuple of measurable controls
u1(t), . . . , un(t).
The payoff of player i is defined as:
Hi(x0, T − t0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
∫ T
t0
hi(x(τ))dτ,
where hi(x) is a continuous function and x(τ) = {x1(τ), . . . , xn(τ)} is the solution of (1) when
open-loop controls u1(t), . . . , un(t) are used and x(t0) = {x1(t0), . . . , xn(t0)} = {x01, . . . , x0n}.
Suppose that there exist an n-tuple of open-loop controls u¯(t) = (u¯1(t), . . . , u¯n(t)) and the
trajectory x¯(t), t ∈ [t0, T ], such that
max
u1(t),...,un(t)
n∑
i=1
Hi(x0, T − t0;u1(t), . . . , un(t)) =
=
n∑
i=1
Hi(x0, T − t0; u¯1(t), . . . , u¯n(t)) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t0
hi(x¯i(τ))dτ. (2)
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The trajectory x¯(t) = (x¯1(t), . . . , x¯n(t)) satisfying (2) we shall call ”optimal cooperative
trajectory”.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. Define in Γ(x0, T − t0) characteristic function in a
classical way:
V (x0, T − t0;N) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t0
hi(x¯i(τ))dτ,
V (x0, T − t0; ∅) = 0,
V (x0, T − t0;S) = V al ΓS,N\S(x0, T − t0), (3)
where V al ΓS,N\S(x0, T − t0) is a value of zero-sum game played between coalition S acting as
first player and coalition N \ S acting as player 2, with payoff of player S equal to:
∑
i∈S
Hi(x0, T − t0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)).
Define L(x0, T − t0) as imputation set in the game Γ(x0, T − t0) (see Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947)):
L(x0, T − t0) = {α = (α1, . . . , αn) :
αi > V (x0, T − t0; {i}),
∑
i∈N
αi = V (x0, T − t0;N)
 . (4)
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Regularized game Γα(x0, T − t0). For every α ∈ L(x0, T − t0) define the noncooperative game
Γα(x0, T − t0), which differs from the game Γ(x0, T − t0) only by payoffs defined along optimal
cooperative trajectory x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0, T ].
Let α ∈ L(x0, T − t0). Define the imputation distribution procedure (IDP) (see Petrosjan (1993))
as function β(τ) = (β1(τ), . . . , βn(τ)), τ ∈ [t0, T ] such that
αi =
∫ T
t0
βi(τ)dτ. (5)
Denote by Hαi (x0, T − t0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function in the game Γα(x0, T − t0) and
by x(τ) the corresponding trajectory, then
H
α
i (x0, T − t0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = Hi(x0, T − t0;u1(·), . . . , un(·))
if there does not exist such t ∈ [t0, T ] that x(τ) = x¯(τ) for τ ∈ (t0, t]. Let
t = sup{t′ : x(τ) = x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0, t′]} and t > t0, then
H
α
i (x0, T − t0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
∫ t
t0
βi(τ)dτ +Hi(x¯(t), T − t;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
∫ t
t0
βi(τ)dτ +
∫ T
t
hi(x(τ))dτ.
In a special case, when x(τ) = x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0, T ] (if x(τ) is an optimal cooperative trajectory in the
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sense of Eq. (2)), we have
H
α
i (x0, T − t0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) =
∫ T
t0
βi(τ)dτ = αi.
By the definition of payoff function in the game Γα(x0, T − t0)we get that the payoffs along the
optimal trajectory are equal to the components of the imputation α = (α1, . . . , αn).
Consider the current subgames (see Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)) — Γ(x¯(t), T − t) along
x¯(t) and current imputation sets L(x¯(t), T − t). Let α(t) ∈ L(x¯(t), T − t). Suppose that α(t) can
be selected as differentiable function of t, t ∈ [t0, T ].
Definition 1. The game Γα(x0, T − t0) is called regularization of the game Γ(x0, T − t0)
(α-regularization) if the IDP β is defined in such a way that
αi(t) =
∫ T
t
βi(τ)dτ
or
βi(t) = −α′i(t). (6)
From (6) we get
αi =
∫ t
t0
βi(τ)dτ + αi(t), (7)
where α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ L(x0, T − t0), and
α(t) = (α1(t), α2(t), . . . , αn(t)) ∈ L(x¯(t), T − t). Suppose now that
M(x0, T − t0) ⊂ L(x0, T − t0) is some optimality principle in the cooperative version of the game
Γ(x0, T − t0), and M(x¯(t), T − t) ⊂ L(x¯(t), T − t) is the same optimality principle defined in the
Slide 7 of 22
subgames Γ(x¯(t), T − t) with initial coalitions on the optimal trajectory. M can be c-core,
HM-solution, Shapley Value, Nucleous e.t.c. If α ∈ M(x0, T − t0), and α(t) ∈ M(x¯(t), T − t) the
condition (7) gives us the time consistence of the chosen imputation α, or the chosen optimality
principle. Then we have the time consistency (dynamic stability) of the chosen cooperative
agreement.
Consider now the problem of strategic stability of cooperative agreements. Based on imputation
distribution procedure β, satisfying (5) we can prove the following basic theorem.
Theorem 1. In the regularization of the game Γα(x0, T − t0) for every ε > 0 there exist an
ε-Nash equilibrium (Nash (1951)) with payoffs α = (α1, . . . , αi, . . . , αn).
Proof. The proof is based on actual constraction of the ε-Nash equilibrium in piecewise open-loop
(POL) strategies with memory.
Remind the definition of POL strategies with memory in differential game. Denote by xˆ(t) any
admissible trajectory of the system (1) on the time interval [t0, t], t ∈ [t0, T ].
The strategy ui(·) of player i is called POL if it consists from the pair (a, σ), where σ is a partition
of time interval [t0, T ], t0 < t1 < . . . < tl = T (tk+1 − tk = δ > 0), and a mapping a which
corresponds to each point (xˆ(tk), tk), tk ∈ σ an open-loop control ui(t), t ∈ [tk, tk+1).
Consider a family of associated with Γ(x, T − t), but not with Γα(x, T − t) zero-sum games
Γ{i},N\{i}(x, T − t) from the initial position x and duration T − t between the coalition S
consisting from a single player i and the coalition N \ {i} with player’s i payoff equal to
Hi(x, T − t;u1(·) . . . , un(·)).
The payoff of player N \ {i} in Γ{i},N\{i}(x, T − t) equals to (−Hi). Let uˆ(x, t; ·) be the
ε-optimal POL strategy of player N \ {i} in Γ{i},N\{i}(x, T − t). Note, that
uˆ(x, t; ·) = {uˆj(x, t; ·)}, j ∈ N \ {i}.
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Let xˆ(t) = {xˆ1(t), . . . , xˆn(t)} be the segment of an admissible trajectory of (1) defined on the
time interval [t0, t], t ∈ [t0, T ]. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} define t¯(i) = sup{ti : xˆi(ti) = ˆ¯xi(ti)}
and t¯(j) = mini t¯(i) = t¯(j). t¯(j) lies in one of the intervals [tk, tk+1), k = 0, 1, . . . , l− 1. Thus,
t¯(i)− t0 is the length of the time interval starting from t0 on which xi(t) coincides with x¯i(t) —
the i-th component of the cooperative trajectory x¯(t). And t¯(j)− t0 is the length of the time
interval starting from t0 on which x(t) coincides with cooperative trajectory x¯(t).
Define the following strategies of player i ∈ N .
u
∗
i (·) =

u¯i(t) for (xˆ(tk), tk) on the optimal cooperative
trajectory x¯(t) (xˆ(τ) = x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0, tk]);
uˆi(xˆ(tk+1), tk+1; ·) i-th component of the ε/2-optimal POL
strategy of player N \ {j} in the game
Γ{j},N\{j}(x(tk+1), T − tk+1), if tk 6 t¯(j) < tk+1;
arbitrary for all other positions.
Show that u∗(·) = (u∗1(·), . . . , u∗n(·)) is ε-Nash equilibrium in Γα(x0, T − t0). The following
equality holds
Hi(x0, T − t0;u∗(·)) = Hi(x0, T − t0;u∗1(·), . . . , u∗n(·)) =
∫ T
t0
βi(t)dt = αi. (8)
Consider the n-tuple (u∗(·)||ui(·)) where player i changes his strategy u∗i (·) on ui(·).
We have to show that
Hi(x0, T − t0;u∗(·)) > Hi(x0, T − t0;u∗(·)||ui(·))− ε. (9)
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for all i ∈ N and all POL ui(·) of player i.
It is easy to see that when the n-tuple u∗(·) is played the game develops along the optimal
trajectory x¯(t). If in (u∗(·)||ui(·)) the trajectory x¯(t) is also realized then (9) will be equality and
thus true. Suppose now that in (u∗(·)||ui(·)) the trajectory x(t) different form x¯(t) is realized.
Then let
t¯ = inf{t : x¯(t) 6= x(t)}.
and t¯ ∈ [tk−1, tk). Since the motion of players are independent we get x¯m(tk) = xm(tk) for
m ∈ N \ {i} and x¯i(tk) 6= xi(tk) (but x¯j(tk−1) = xj(tk−1) for j ∈ N). Then from the
definition of u∗(·) it follows that the players m ∈ N \ {i} will use their strategies uˆm(xˆ(tk), tk; ·)
which are ε2 -optimal in a zero-sum game Γ{i},N\{i}(x(tk), T − tk) against the player i which
deviates from the optimal trajectory on a time interval [tk−1, tk).
If the players from the set N \ {i} will use their strategies uˆm(xˆ(tk), tk; ·), player i starting from
position x(tk), tk will get not more than
V (x(tk), T − tk; {i}) +
ε
2
,
where V (x(tk), T − tk; {i}) is the value of the game Γ{i},N\{i}(x(tk), T − tk). Then the total
payoff of player i in Γα(x0, T − t0) when the n-tuple of strategies (u∗(·)||ui(·)) is played cannot
exceed the amount∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x(tk), tk; {i}) +
ε
2
+
∫ tk
tk−1
hi(xi(τ))dτ. (10)
But the payoff of player i when the n-tuple u∗(·) is played is equal to
αi =
∫ T
t0
βi(τ)dτ =
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ +
∫ T
tk−1
βi(τ)dτ =
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + αi(tk−1). (11)
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By the definition of IDP (see (5), (6)), αi(tk−1) ∈ L(x¯(tk−1), T − tk−1),
∫ T
tk−1
βi(τ)dτ = αi(tk−1) > V (x¯(tk−1), T − tk−1; {i}). (12)
From the continuity of the function V and continuity of the trajectory x(t) by appropriate choice of
δ > 0 (tk+1 − tk = δ) the following inequalities can be guaranteed:
|V (x¯(tk−1), T − tk−1; {i})− V (x(tk), T − tk; {i})| <
ε
4
,∫ T
tk−1
βi(τ)dτ = αi(tk−1) > V (x(tk), T − tk; {i})−
ε
4
.
Compare αi(tk−1) and V (x(tk), tk; {i}) + ε2 +
∫ tk
tk−1 hi(xi(τ))dτ . By choosing δ = tk+1 − tk
sufficiently small one can achieve that the integral
∫ tk
tk−1 hi(xi(τ))dτ will be also small (less than
ε/4).
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Adding to both sides of (12) the amount
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ and using the previous inequality we get
αi =
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + αi(tk−1) >
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x¯(tk−1), T − tk−1; {i}) >
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x(tk), T − tk; {i})−
ε
4
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x(tk), T − tk; {i})−
ε
4
+
∫ tk
tk−1
hi(τ)dτ −
ε
4
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x(tk), T − tk; {i}) +
∫ tk
tk−1
hi(τ)dτ −
ε
2
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x(tk), T − tk; {i}) +
∫ tk
tk−1
hi(τ)dτ +
+
ε
2
− ε
2
− ε
2
. (13)
Here first four addends in the right part of the inequality constitute the upper bound of player i
payoff when (u∗(·)||u∗i (·)) is played. But αi is the payoff of player i when u∗(·) is played, and we
get
Hi(x0, T − t0;u∗(·)) = αi >
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x(tk), T − tk; {i}) +
∫ tk
tk−1
hi(τ)dτ +
ε
2
− ε >
> Hi(x0, T − t0;u∗(·)||ui(·))− ε (14)
and we get (9). The theorem is proved. 
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This means that the cooperative solution (any imputation) can be strategically supported in a
regularized game Γα(x0, T − t0) (realized in a specially constructed Nash equilibrium) by the Nash
equilibrium u∗(·) defined in the Theorem 1.
Conditions for the irrational behavior proofness of the cooperative solutions. Suppose now that in
some intermediate instant of time the irrational behavior of some player (or players) will force the
other players to leave the cooperative agreement, then the irrational behavior proofness condition
(see D.W.K. Yeung (2007)) requires that the following inequality must be satisfied
V (x0, T − t0; {i}) ≤
∫ t
t0
βi(τ)dτ + V (x¯(t), T − t; {i}), i ∈ N. (15)
If the IDP β(t) can be chosen in such a way, that both time-consistency and irrational behavior
proofness conditions are satisfied (the strategic stability as we have shown follows from
time-consistency) the cooperative agreement about the choice of the imputation
α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) is stable.
From (15) we have the following condition for IDP β(τ) = (β1(τ), β2(τ), . . . , βn(τ)):
βi(τ) ≥
d
dτ
V (x¯(τ), T − τ ; {i}), i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
Not always all3 conditions can be satisfied together. The next example show that in the discrete
time case Shapley Value did not satisfy all these conditions.
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2 Discrete time case
In what follows as basic model we shall consider the game in extensive form with perfect
information.
Definition 2. A game tree is a finite oriented treelike graph K with the root x0.
We shall use the following notations. Let x be some vertex (position). We denote by K(x) a
subtree K with the root in x. We denote by Z(x) immediate successors of x. The vertices y,
directly following after x, are called alternatives in x (y ∈ Z(x)). The player who makes a decision
in x (who selects the next alternative position in x), will be denoted by i(x). The choice of player
i(x) in position x will be denoted by x¯ ∈ Z(x).
Let N = {1, . . . , n} — be the set of all players in the game.
Definition 3. A game in extensive form with perfect information (see Kuhn (1953)) G(x0) is a
graph tree K(x0), with the following additional properties:
• The set of vertices (positions) is split up into n + 1 subsets P1, P2, . . . , Pn+1, which form
a partition of the set of all vertices of the graph tree K. The vertices (positions) x ∈ Pi
are called players i personal positions, i = 1, . . . , n; vertices (positions) x ∈ Pn+1 are
called terminal positions.
• In each final vertex (position) the system of real numbers h(w) = (h1(w), . . . , hn(w)),
w ∈ Pn+1, hi(w) > 0, i = 1, . . . , n is defined. Where hi(w) is the payoff of player i in
the final vertex (position).
Definition 4. A strategy of player i is a mapping Ui(·), which associate to each position x ∈ Pi a
unique alternative y ∈ Z(x).
As in the previous case denote by Hi(x;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function od player i ∈ N in
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the subgame G(x) starting from the position x.
Hi(x;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = hi(x′l)
where x′l ∈ Pn+1 is the last vertex (position) in the path x = (x′1, x′2, . . . , x′l) realized in the
subgame G(x), when the n-tuple of strategies (u1(·), . . . , un(·)) is played.
Denote by u¯(·) = (u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) the n-tuple of strategies and the trajectory (path)
x¯ = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯m), x¯m ∈ Pn+1 such that
max
u1(·),...,un(·)
n∑
i=1
Hi(x0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
n∑
i=1
Hi(x0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) =
n∑
i=1
hi(x¯m). (17)
The path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m) satisfying Eq. (17) we shall call ”optimal cooperative trajectory”.
Define in G(x0) characteristic function in a classical way
V (x0;N) =
n∑
i=1
hi(x¯m),
V (x0; ∅) = 0,
V (x0;S) = V al ΓS,N\S(x0),
where V al ΓS,N\S(x0) is a value of zero-sum game played between coalition S acting as first
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player and coalition N \ S acting as player 2, with payoff of player S equal to∑
i∈S
Hi(x0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)).
Define L(x0) as imputation set in the game G(x0).
L(x0) =
α = (α1, . . . , αn) : αi > V (x0; {i}), ∑
i∈N
αi = V (x0;N)
 .
Regularized game Gα(x0). For every α ∈ L(x0) define the noncooperative game Gα(x0), which
differs from the game G(x0) only by payoffs defined along optimal cooperative path
x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m). Let α ∈ L(x0). Define the imputation distribution procedure (IDP) as function
βk = (β1(k), . . . , βn(k)), k = 0, 1, . . . ,m such that
αi =
m∑
k=0
βi(k). (18)
Define by Hαi (x0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function in the game Gα(x0) and by
x¯ = {x¯0, . . . , x¯m} the cooperative path
H
α
i (x0;u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = Hi(x0;u1(·), . . . , un(·))
for all u1(·), . . . , un(·) such that the path x = {x0, . . . , xm} differs from x¯ = {x¯0, . . . , x¯m}, and
H
α
i (x0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) = αi.
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By the definition of the payoff function in the game Gα(x0) we get that the payoffs along the
optimal cooperative trajectory are equal to the components of the imputation α = (α1, . . . , αn).
Consider current subgames G(x¯k) along the optimal path x¯ and current imputation sets L(x¯k).
Let αk ∈ L(x¯k).
Definition 5. The game Gα(x0) is called regularization of the game G(x0) (α-regularization) if
the IDP β is defined in such a way that
α
k
i =
m∑
j=k
βi(j)
or βi(k) = α
k
i − αk+1i , i ∈ N , k = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1, βi(m) = αmi , α0i = αi.
Theorem 2. In the regularization of the game Gα(x0) there exist a Nash equilibrium with payoffs
α = (α1, . . . , αn).
Proof. Along the cooperative path we have
α
k
i > V (x¯k; {i}), i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
since αk = (αk1 , . . . , α
k
n) ∈ L(x¯k) is an imputation in G(x¯k) (note that here V (x¯k; {i}) is
computed in the subgame G(x¯k) but not Gα(x¯k)). In the same time
α
k
i =
m∑
j=k
βi(j)
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and we get
m∑
j=k
βi(j) > V (x¯k; {i}), i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m. (19)
But
∑m
j=k βi(j) is the payoff of player i in the subgame Gα(x¯k) along the cooperative path, and
from (19) using the arguments similar to those in the proof of Theorem 1 one can construct the
Nash equilibrium with payoffs α = (α1, . . . , αn) and resulting cooperative path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m).
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Example. In this example as an imputation we shall consider Shapley value [Shapley (1953)]. Using
the proposed regularization of the game we shall see that there exist a Nash equilibrium with payoffs
equal to the components of the Shapley value.
Fig. 1. Game G(x0)
In the game G(x0), N = {1, 2, 3}, P1 = {x1, x4, x7}, P2 = {x2, x5, x8}, P3 = {x3, x6, x9},
P4 = {y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8, y9, y10}. h(y1) = (0, 5, 2), h(y2) = (6, 1, 0),
h(y3) = (1, 5, 0), h(y4) = (0, 2, 7), h(y5) = (0, 9, 0), h(y6) = (4, 1, 2), h(y7) = (2, 3, 2),
h(y8) = (0, 9, 0), h(y9) = (0, 3, 4), h(y10) = (1, 8, 1). The cooperative path is
x¯ = {x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, x¯4, x¯5, x¯6, x¯7, x¯8, x¯9, y¯10}.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 y10
V (x; {1}) 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1
V (x; {2}) 2 2 2 2 9 1 3 9 3 8
V (x; {3}) 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 1
V (x; {1, 2}) 7 7 6 9 9 5 9 9 3 9
V (x; {2, 3}) 7 9 9 9 9 5 5 9 9 9
V (x; {1, 3}) 6 6 6 7 0 6 4 0 4 2
V (x; {1, 2, 3}) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Sh(x; {1}) 17
6
13
6
12
6
16
6
2
6
22
6
24
6
2
6
2
6
1
Sh(x; {2}) 26
6
28
6
27
6
28
6
56
6
16
6
30
6
56
6
26
6
8
Sh(x; {3}) 17
6
19
6
21
6
16
6
2
6
22
6
6
6
2
6
32
6
1
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 y10
β1(j)
2
6
4
6
1
6
14
6
− 28
6
− 2
6
22
6
0 − 4
6
1
β2(j) −
1
6
− 2
6
1
6
− 28
6
40
6
− 14
6
− 28
6
30
6
− 22
6
8
β3(j) −
1
6
− 2
6
− 2
6
14
6
− 20
6
16
6
4
6
− 30
6
26
6
1
It can be easily seen that the inequality (19)
m∑
j=k
βi(j) > V (x¯k; {i})
for i ∈ N holds in this case, but the irration-behavior-proofness condition is not satisfied.
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